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Institutional and cultural barriers to transferring Lean production to China: Evidence 
from a German automotive components manufacturer 
 
Abstract 
Our qualitative study of a globally operating German automotive components manufacturer 
demonstrates how certain cognitive dispositions and behaviours of Chinese employees acted 
as barriers to the transfer of the firm’s Lean production system to its subsidiaries in China. We 
analyse how these barriers were rooted in the Chinese institutional and cultural context, 
thereby contributing a new micro-level perspective to business systems literature. Our 
findings further suggest that manufacturing in China will not be truly ‘Lean’ in the near future, 
which may place constraints on China’s technological development at a larger scale.  
 
Key words: practice transfer, business system, China, Lean, manufacturing, production, 
institution, culture 
 
2  
Introduction 
China has become a prime manufacturing location for Western firms, who have established 
production facilities there in the hope of lower labour costs, higher profit margins, and the 
potential of a vast and growing market. These firms tend to use established operational 
practices of Lean manufacturing, aiming at high levels of process efficiency and product 
quality. To connect China's manufacturing potential with the efficiency of Lean philosophy is 
therefore a major goal in the emerging global marketplace. At the same time, the transfer of 
the Lean production systems of Western firms to China is constrained by severe barriers (e.g. 
Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Oliver et al., 1998). To facilitate the successful transfer of 
Lean production systems, it is necessary to understand these barriers as well as their root 
causes in the Chinese country context. 
As yet, researchers have not systematically addressed why barriers arise in the Chinese 
context and how they affect the Lean system. Given this lack of prior research, we used an 
inductive case study of a German globally-operating automotive parts supplier to identify a 
range of barriers to Lean transfer at the level of the cognitive dispositions and behaviours of 
Chinese members of the firm’s subsidiaries and supplier firms. Drawing on our respondents’ 
reports as well as concepts of transnational practice transfer (Kostova, 1999) and the Chinese 
business system (Redding and Witt, 2007, 2014), we explain how these barriers originate in 
Chinese institutional and cultural contexts.  
In what follows, we will first provide a brief introduction to the core principles of 
Lean manufacturing. We then review prior studies on Lean manufacturing in China, as well as 
relevant concepts regarding transnational practice transfer and national business systems. This 
leads to the research questions of this study, followed by the methods section. We present our 
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results regarding deficiencies in the Lean production system, barriers to the transfer of Lean to 
China, and their roots in Chinese institutional and cultural context. After this, we raise 
questions on the need to adapt to the Chinese context, followed by a discussion of our 
contributions to the literatures on transnational practice transfer and national business systems. 
We conclude by outlining limitations of the study and directions for future research. 
 
Lean Manufacturing 
The idea of Lean manufacturing came to prominence in the late 1980s. Based on their study 
on the world’s automotive industry’s performance in the 1980s, Womack et al. (1990) 
highlighted how Japanese automotive production plants achieved higher productivity and 
quality than Western plants. The researchers named the Japanese manufacturing model ‘Lean 
manufacturing’. This term has since been associated with the practice of distinguishing value-
adding activities from waste activities, both within an organisation and in its supply chain 
(Comm and Mathaisel, 2005). Lean manufacturing provides a way of doing more with less – 
less human effort, less equipment, less time, and less space (Womack and Jones, 2003) – by 
following five core principles: (1) specifying value by specific products, (2) identifying the 
value stream for each product, (3) making value flow without interruptions, (4) letting the 
customer pull value from the producer, and (5) pursuing perfection (Womack and Jones, 
2003). 
More specifically, Womack and Jones claim that Lean thinking must start with a value 
definition in terms of products with specific capabilities, through dialogue with specific 
customers. Every feature of a product or service not valued by the customer is regarded as 
‘waste’. The steps within the value stream are hence classified into those that create value, 
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those that do not create value but are unavoidable, and those that do not create value and are 
immediately avoidable. Waste can be found in overproduction, waiting times, transportation, 
processing, inventory, movement, and production of defective parts (e.g. Slack et al., 2004). 
A common practice to prevent defects and thus wasteful production are line stops by 
workers. If, during production, defects or abnormal situations arise, line workers are 
empowered to stop the entire production line. Based on the stoppage of the entire line, other 
operators cannot continue their work and are instructed to investigate the problem and take 
necessary corrective actions. Forcing immediate attention to the problem, an investigation into 
its root cause and initiation of corrective action may prevent similar defects from occurring 
again. In addition, preventive maintenance of machinery before it breaks down contributes to 
lower risks of interruption to production flow. 
Lean manufacturing also requires that value-creating steps closely flow together. 
Traditional mass production systems use inventory as buffers between each production step to 
allow for production in an uninterrupted and consequently locally efficient way at each stage 
of the process. Lean, however, and more precisely its Just-in-Time (JIT) principle, avoids 
such isolation of stages. Production in the upstream workplace is initiated by orders from the 
downstream workplace, leading to ‘one or single-piece flow’ production. Given the missing 
buffers between up and downstream workplaces, the workplaces are interdependent. When 
problems at a single workplace occur, all other workplaces are affected, and workers need to 
join in solving problems instantly rather than allowing problems to be passed down the 
production line. 
Lean production also follows a pull-demand signal, whereby the customer ‘pulls’ the 
product from the firm rather than the firm ‘pushing’ products into the market. Lean firms 
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design, schedule, and produce precisely what the end-customer wants and when they want it. 
This system ensures that only actually-needed parts and material are brought to the production 
line, thus reducing inventories and helping to minimize waste. 
Lean further requires companies to pursue perfection by applying all principles until 
ideal value is created without waste (Womack and Jones, 2003). This is achieved through 
continuous improvement or ‘kaizen’. In comparison to traditional production, where 
improvement activities take place infrequently in response to major changes, kaizen aims to 
improve processes of the system continuously and incrementally (Bicheno and Holweg, 2009). 
Improvements have to be initiated actively by all employees, including the shop floor (Ohno, 
1988), which demands the participation and responsibility of the entire workforce.  
 
Lean manufacturing in China 
To our knowledge, there is little research on the transfer of Lean manufacturing methods to 
China. Moreover, the few extant studies do not provide a systematic overview of barriers to 
Lean transfer, and hardly discuss country-context factors that may be at the root of such 
difficulties. With a few notable exceptions (e.g. Oliver et al., 1998), existing researches draw 
only on small-scale, anecdotal evidence. 
Extant research does, however, provide clear indications that Lean production systems 
in China face serious difficulties. Authors report cases where product quality was 
unsatisfactory (Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Aoki, 2008; Chin and Pun, 2002; Comm and 
Mathaisel, 2005; Lee, 2004; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005), workplace organisation 
tools could not be utilized (Chen and Bo, 2008; Paolini et al., 2005), it was not possible to 
realize continuous improvement (e.g. Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Aoki, 2008; Oliver et al., 
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1998; Paolini et al., 2005), or JIT production and low inventory levels were not achieved 
(Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Oliver et al., 1998).  
From our reading of these studies, we can discern seven potential barriers to Lean 
transfer in China: lack of technical and Lean knowledge, lack of initiative and participation, 
tolerance of untidiness, high employee turnover, management styles, missing long-term 
strategy, inadequate quality control procedures, and weak supplier performance. 
 Lack of technical and Lean knowledge has been regarded as a major impediment to 
Lean manufacturing in Chinese plants (Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Brown and O’Rourke, 
2007; Lee, 2004; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005). Well-educated workers with Lean 
manufacturing experience are rare in the job market. Moreover, driven by cost-saving 
strategies, many factories intentionally attract poorly educated workers from rural areas, from 
agricultural villages with little exposure to basic manufacturing techniques, let alone Lean 
production principles (Brown and O’Rourke, 2007; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005).  
Along with the lack of knowledge, several authors address a lack of initiative and 
participation of workers as severe impediment to Lean manufacturing in China (Aoki, 2008; 
Chen and Bo, 2008; Chin and Pun, 2002; Lee, 2004; Paolini et al., 2005; Taj, 2005). To 
illustrate, Aoki (2008) describes a lack of initiative among Chinese shop-floor workers in a 
Japanese firm trying to transfer kaizen activities to overseas plants in China. Japanese 
management in this firm found it difficult to encourage Chinese workers to take initiatives, 
and only employees above team-leader levels made suggestions for process improvements. 
Similarly, Chin and Pun (2002) report on a lack of participation. Operators and supervisors 
were seen to be unwilling to contribute to improvements, or unaware of how to do this.  
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A few researchers further address a tolerance of untidiness within Chinese workers as 
an obstacle to Lean. Paolini et al. (2005) report that Chinese workers’ tolerance for an untidy 
or disorganized workplace conflicted with housekeeping tools such as 5S. Similarly, Wong 
(2007) observed an ignorance of accuracy by Chinese workers. 
High employee turnover has been described a major obstacle to Lean production in 
China (Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Aoki, 2008; Brown and O’Rourke, 2007; Paolini et al., 
2005; Taj, 2005). For example, Taj indicates that 10 per cent of the companies taking part in 
their survey reported an annual employee turnover of more than 30 per cent. It is apparent that 
such high employee turnover makes it very hard to develop the missing technical expertise 
and Lean knowledge mentioned above. 
Several authors highlight how Chinese management styles impede the application of 
Lean manufacturing in Chinese plants (Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Aoki, 2008; Brown and 
O’Rourke, 2007; Chin and Pun, 2002; Lee, 2004; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005; 
Taj, 2005; Wong, 2007). According to Lean philosophy, shop-floor workers need to be 
empowered to suggest and conduct improvements from the bottom up (Liker and Meyer, 
2007). Such empowerment is however relatively new to Chinese managers (Oliver et al., 
1998). In Aoki’s (2008) case study, for example, Chinese employees beyond team-leader 
level did not feel authorized to make suggestions for process improvements. Similarly, 
Aminpour and Woetzel (2006) discern that the hierarchical nature of Chinese organisations 
hinders the cooperation and joint decision-making needed for problem-solving as part of Lean, 
and Paolini et al. (2005) report on a general top-down approach, with middle managers being 
afraid of losing authority when empowering employees as part of Lean implementation. 
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A central principle of Lean is that all decisions have to be made on a long-term basis, 
even if this results in additional effort in the present. Several authors observe that Chinese 
managers in Lean manufacturing plants lack such a long-term strategic orientation 
(Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Chen and Bo, 2008; Chin and Pun, 2002; Comm and 
Mathaisel, 2005; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005). Aminpour and Woetzel (2006), for 
example, explain that managers focused on ‘fighting fires’ rather than on long-term 
implementation of Lean. In the same vein, Aminpour and Woetzel (2006) and Paolini et al. 
(2005) perceived that managers allocated too short ramp-up periods when launching new 
product lines, leading to quality problems. Managers thus underestimated the time required 
for the training and refining processes necessary for achieving Lean principles such as 
continuous improvement and waste elimination. 
Inadequate quality control procedures seem to be another barrier to Lean 
manufacturing in Chinese plants (Aminpour and Woetzel, 2006; Aoki, 2008; Chin and Pun, 
2002; Comm and Mathaisel, 2005; Lee, 2004; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005). 
Researchers have observed that quality control procedures were poor in cases where product 
quality was not monitored sufficiently during the production process (Oliver et al. 1998; Lee, 
2004), production time was not calculated, and too little documentation was used (Comm and 
Mathaisel, 2005).  
Weak supplier performance has often been highlighted as a barrier to Lean in China 
(Comm and Mathaisel, 2005; Taj, 2005; Oliver et al., 1998; Paolini et al., 2005; Lee, 2004). 
Suppliers have been described as unreliable with regard to quality and on-time delivery, both 
of which are required for JIT production and low inventory levels at the client firm. As a 
consequence, many Chinese manufacturers and joint ventures tend to depend on key parts or 
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machinery from overseas companies or their parent firm abroad. Such imports, however, 
require long delivery times (Comm and Mathaisel, 2005) and can be further delayed through 
long customs procedures (Paolini et al., 2005), making it difficult to produce JIT without 
warehousing key parts (Comm and Mathaisel, 2005; Lee, 2004). 
Barriers of this kind (for example a lack of knowledge and inappropriate management 
styles) would impede Lean implementation in any country. However, prior research on Lean 
in China suggests that these barriers are more prevalent in China than in the West or Japan. 
We scrutinize this suggestion by examining whether and how Lean implementation barriers 
are tied to the Chinese country context. Where relevant, we will highlight how this context 
differs from German and Japanese contexts. To examine the influence of the Chinese context 
on the transfer of Lean, we will draw on the literatures of transnational practice transfer and 
national business systems. 
 
Transnational practice transfer and the Chinese business system 
The transfer of a Lean production system from a Western to the Chinese context can be 
regarded as a case of transnational practice transfer. As outlined by Kostova (1999: 311), 
transnational practice transfer is successful to the extent that it becomes institutionalized at the 
recipient unit. Institutionalisation means that the practice is both implemented, i.e. the 
recipient unit follows the formal rules implied by the practice, and internalized, i.e. employees 
at the recipient unit accept and approve of the practice and adopt it as part of their 
organisational identity.  
According to Kostova’s framework, transnational practice transfer is affected by the 
social, organisational, and relational contexts of the recipient unit. Our focus is here on the 
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social context, and more specifically on Chinese institutions and culture. We acknowledge 
that culture has often been regarded as part of the informal institutions that underpin formal 
institutions (see Cantwell et al., 2010; Peng et al., 2008). Nevertheless, we preserve the 
distinction between culture and institutions in order to highlight the importance of culture as 
such. We thus follow Hofstede et al.’s (2002: 800) concept of culture as a ‘substratum’, rather 
than component, of institutions.  
Transnational practice-transfer studies (e.g. Eden and Miller, 2004; Gaur et al., 2007; 
Kostova, 1999; Peng et al., 2008) commonly argue that organisational practices are shaped by 
their original institutional environment and are therefore not always consistent with the 
institutional environment to which they are transferred. For this reason, the success of practice 
transfer is seen to depend on the institutional distance between home and recipient units. 
Greater institutional distance does, for example, create greater ‘relational hazards’, due to a 
firm’s unfamiliarity with host-country institutions (Eden and Miller, 2004). Following Scott’s 
(1995) definition of institutions, these transnational practice-transfer studies tend to examine 
institutional distance with respect to the home and recipient units’ regulatory institutions 
(existing laws and rules), cognitive institutions (shared cognitive categories) and normative 
institutions (values and norms)  
It is important to note here that a country’s institutional context exists not just in its 
formal institutions (such as governmental and educational institutions), but also in the 
cognitive and normative dispositions that guide the behaviour of the members of the 
institutional context, who are thus ‘carriers of the institutionalized knowledge of the society’ 
(Kostova, 1999: 315). We follow this definition of institutional context, by examining how 
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this context is manifested in certain cognitive dispositions and behaviours of organisational 
members.  
  Jackson and Deeg (2008) have highlighted that research on institutional distance 
ignores the potential importance of particular combinations of institutional factors, by 
aggregating the host of institutional factors of a country context into a single measure of 
institutional distance. By contrast, studies on national business systems examine how certain 
institutional factors are systemically interdependent and thereby constitute configurations (or 
typical cases) of institutional factors that are specific to certain countries. Following this line 
of reasoning, Redding and Witt (2007; Witt and Redding, 2014) describe the Chinese business 
system with regard to a broad set of interdependent elements. They highlight how a particular 
combination of cultural and institutional determinants is at the route of China-specific 
structures and systems for coordinating economic behaviour and exchange, which include 
particular mechanisms of ownership, networks, and management. Our approach accords with 
the business-systems perspective (and diverges from the notion of institutional distance) by 
exploring the particular combination of interrelated institutional and cultural context factors 
that are relevant for the transfer of Lean to China. These factors are thus a subset of the 
institutional and cultural factors in the Chinese business system. 
Redding and Witt’s (2007) model of the Chinese business system acknowledges that 
members of Chinese society (such as managers and workers in organisations) are the actors in 
the system. For example, workers and managers are seen to follow a non-participative 
management logic, based on the traditional authority of the ‘lao ban’ (big  boss) of family-
owned firms. Foremost, however, their model describes the business system at the levels of 
country and firms, rather than the level of actors. Our study takes a different approach, by 
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singling out certain actor characteristics, namely cognitive dispositions and behaviours of 
Chinese employees of the firm and supplier firms, which we interpret in relation to the 
Chinese institutional and cultural context. We will hence demonstrate how the institutional 
and cultural context affects Lean transfer through these actor characteristics.  
Following the rationale of our literature review, we conducted a qualitative case study 
to gain a more comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the transfer of a Lean 
manufacturing system of a German automobile supplies firm to manufacturing sites in China. 
We gathered the perspectives of Chinese and German employees of the German automotive 
supplies company in two production plants in China to answer the following research 
questions (RQs): 
RQ1: What are the main barriers to the transfer of the Lean system to China? 
RQ2: How do these barriers affect Lean principles? 
RQ3: Are these barriers linked to the Chinese institutional and cultural context, and how? 
 
Methods 
Our inquiry followed a qualitative, interpretivist methodology. In line with Geertz’s (1973) 
suggestions, we regard the data as our constructions of the respondents’ constructions of their 
social reality. More specifically, we obtained the respondents’ accounts of the Lean transfer 
process, and analysed them in the light of theoretical constructs such as Lean principles and 
the Chinese business system.  
Qualitative methods are particularly suitable for investigating social phenomena from 
the actors’ perspective, and for exploring new research questions (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). 
The use of case study allowed us to explore the nature of the barriers to Lean transfer in a 
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particular company and country context, in line with Yin’s (2003) classic recommendations. 
Our methods were further designed to achieve ‘credibility’ and ‘transferability’, two 
important criteria for judging the quality of qualitative research (Lincoln and Guba, 1999). To 
achieve credibility, we followed the principles of theoretical sampling, prolonged engagement, 
and negative case analysis (see Schwandt, 2007), as detailed below. To allow for 
transferability, we provide a ‘thick’ description of the study context, enabling other 
researchers to examine whether the findings transfer to similar contexts. 
 
Setting  
The automotive industry provides a particularly useful setting for examining barriers to the 
transfer of Lean, and their associations with the country context. The concept of Lean was 
originally developed in this industry and has been refined there over a long period, which 
makes it easier to distinguish between universal barriers to the transnational transfer of Lean 
systems and those caused by a particular national context. In other areas, such as banking or 
healthcare, Lean is a relatively recent phenomenon, making it harder to differentiate between 
barriers caused by transferring Lean manufacturing techniques to the service sector as 
opposed to barriers caused by the national context. 
The German automobile industry in particular is a useful setting for studying Lean 
transfer, as it has to large extents adopted the original Lean principles (Jürgens, 2003). This is 
despite Streeck’s (1996) concerns that the German, compared to the Japanese, institutional 
environment does not fulfil the conditions for Lean, particularly with regard to its smaller 
degrees of firm-specific vocational training and necessary lifelong employment in a firm. We 
will later see that these potential incompatibilities of German institutions with Japanese Lean 
14  
principles appear very minor compared to those of the Chinese institutional and cultural 
context.  
We obtained our data in a globally operating German automotive component 
manufacturer that had been represented in China for several decades. For a number of years, 
the firm’s headquarters had made intensive efforts towards the worldwide implementation of 
the company’s own Lean production system. This Lean system was explicitly designed 
according to the core principles of the original Toyota system and had been applied 
successfully in the firm's German sites.  
With the help of previous work contacts, we secured headquarters’ approval of the 
study. We then used this approval to contact two plants in China which manufactured similar 
products. Qualitative research findings are more robust if they hold in different, but 
comparable, settings (see Lincoln and Guba, 1999), in this case similar production systems 
(for example regarding assembly-line design, employee numbers within assembly lines). At 
the same time, contextual differences between cases (such as location) can reveal the 
influence of these differences. By keeping the influence of the product and organisational 
features stable, we were thus able to investigate the influences of the two plants’ different 
geographic location, and their different level of maturity. 
We included two production plants of the firm, one in Changsha in midland (south-
central) China, and the other in Suzhou in the Yangtze River Delta economic development 
zone, near the highly developed coastal belt. Changsha as a city is less industrialized than 
Suzhou, but has seen strong development over the last years. Low labour costs and huge 
volumes of workers from nearby rural areas have attracted many foreign firms to set up 
manufacturing plants, including the participating company site in 2005. The plant produced 
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small electrical motors for automobile manufacturers, including starter motors, alternators, 
blower motors, condenser motors, window-lift motors, cooling motors, and wiper motors. At 
the time of data collection (spring 2010), the plant had around 1000 employees, with plans for 
further significant expansions. 
Suzhou, in turn, is a well-established industrial area, where multinational firms have 
set up manufacturing sites over several years. Due to the competitive environment and 
proximity to Shanghai, labour costs are significantly higher than in Changsha. The plant’s 
main products are small automotive components, such as brake systems and chassis control 
systems. The plant was founded in 1999. By the time of the study, it comprised c.1000 
employees, with plans for further expansion. Given that the two plants differed with regard to 
their maturity and proximity to the most highly developed coastal region of China, we were 
able to examine how the barriers to Lean transfer depended on the stages of a subsidiary's 
development and its immediate environment, and how the barriers were therefore likely to 
change over time.  
 
Data collection 
The second author, a German national, conducted semi-structured interviews with sixty 
participants: fifteen German, one Spanish, and fifteen Chinese employees in Changsha; and 
two German, one French, and 26 Chinese employees in Suzhou (see Appendix for participant 
details). The small number of Western participants in Suzhou accords with the small number 
of expatriates in this plant. Six main departments were included in Changsha and four in 
Suzhou, as well as a cross-divisional Lean implementation team in each plant, which 
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consisted of Lean experts and implementation managers. Following the terminology used by 
the respondents, we distinguish between management and office level1. The majority of 
respondents at both levels held a university degree, typically in engineering (except for 
members of the HR department). Most respondents had obtained hands-on experience of 
working on the production line alongside a grounded knowledge of Lean principles. The 
attempt to include shop-floor workers failed, due to language difficulties and power 
differentials, even when using a translator. 
The interviews were conducted in English for the Chinese, Spanish, and French 
respondent, and in German for the German participants. The interviews lasted between 30-45 
minutes, with an average of 36 minutes. They were all tape-recorded, apart from one, for 
which extensive notes were taken. The structure of the interviews was determined largely by 
the respondents’ emphasis and emergent themes, but an interview guideline served to cover 
the core questions, which were adjusted continuously. After introducing the general research 
aims and confidentiality assurance, the researcher asked respondents about their age, tenure, 
experience, position, responsibilities in the company, and their estimated knowledge about 
Lean production principles. Respondents were then asked for their judgment on how well the 
Lean system worked in China compared to Germany, and reasons for difficulties. Where 
necessary, more directed questioning was used to cover the main potential barriers to the Lean 
transfer. At the final stage of the interviews, these directed questions included aspects of the 
supply chain, time planning, inventory levels, intercultural interactions, work styles, employee 
turnover, education and knowledge, management styles, and HRM practices. Respondents 
were also asked to explain whether the barriers were affected by the Chinese country context, 
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particularly regarding communication styles, work styles, cultural and demographic 
characteristics and infrastructure, as well as political, historical, and economic factors. 
The researcher made additional use of contextual documents, namely organizational 
charts, the plants’ monthly newsletter, the worldwide company magazine, and product 
brochures. These served to obtain information on company culture, products, and the country 
context. Illustrations and figures on the visual boards within the assembly lines provided an 
impression of the number and types of quality deviations during the assembly process. Real-
life observations were made during guided shop-floor visits throughout the researcher’s two-
month stay in China. For example, the researcher observed how workers continued to work on 
their tasks even when they should have assisted a colleague in solving a machine stoppage, as 
required by the one-piece flow principle of Lean. 
 
Data analysis 
During the fieldwork phase, the interviewer began creating codes to capture themes derived 
from the literature, as well as emergent themes. New themes were incorporated into each 
subsequent interview, leading to an iterative process of data collection and analysis. After the 
fieldwork phase, all interviews were transcribed and coded in NVivo (QSR) software, using 
the codes developed during the fieldwork. By reading through all the transcripts, the data were 
organized through clustering and merging of codes, and themes mentioned by only a very 
small number of interviewees were excluded. 
NVivo node lookups then served to compare the responses on barriers, effects on Lean 
principles, and context factors between (a) the two sites, (b) Western and Chinese participants, 
and (c) different hierarchy levels (managers versus office employees). Throughout the data 
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analysis of each barrier, a model was developed to capture the detailed description of the 
barrier, its effects on Lean principles, and the country-context factors. When responses of 
different participant groups were contradictory, explanatory factors were identified. This 
negative case analysis fed into the continuous refinement of the model of barriers, effects on 
Lean, and context factors across sites and respondent groups (summarized in Figure 1). Due to 
the lack of prior research on the matter, the models were derived to a large extent inductively.  
 
Results 
Our respondents provided vivid accounts of difficulties in transferring the company’s Lean 
production system to the Chinese context. Respondents from both sites, all nationality groups, 
and all levels of the hierarchy provided consistent reports on the nature of the barriers, their 
effect on Lean principles, and their root causes in the Chinese country context. The 
accordance of views provides strong support for our model. These respondent groups did, 
however, vary in their views on the gravity of certain barriers. Firstly, we observed that 
Western expatriates tended to portray certain barriers as a larger threat to Lean transfer than 
the Chinese respondents did. This difference in perception could be due to the expatriates’ 
closer experience of the Lean system in Germany, allowing them to better evaluate its 
comparative performance. In the same vein, managers, compared to office employees (apart 
from members of the Lean implementation team), tended to demonstrate a more thorough 
understanding of the negative effects that the barriers had on the transfer process. This can be 
attributed to their broader overview of the performance of the entire production system. There 
were also slight differences between the two locations with regard to the perceived severity of 
the barriers, which will be mentioned throughout below. In what follows, we present the 
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respondents’ description of deficiencies in the Lean system, followed by their explanations 
through barriers and underlying context factors.  
 
Deficiencies in the firm’s Lean production system in China 
At the time of data collection, the Lean production system was working unsatisfactorily in 
both the Suzhou and Changsha plants. Target product-quality standards had not been met, and 
several core principles of Lean production had not been achieved. In particular, the plants had 
been unable to achieve low levels of waste and inventory, a constant production flow, one-
piece flow, or JIT production. They had also been unable to utilize Lean tools appropriately, 
realize continuous improvement or preventive maintenance, or build a reliable supplier 
network. Lean principles had thus not been fully implemented. In what follows, it will 
become clear that they were also far from being internalized by the local workforce. 
 
Barriers to the transfer of the Lean system to China 
As reasons for the difficulties, participants described six main barriers. Five of these can be 
defined as cognitive dispositions or behaviours of the company’s workforce: (1) lack of Lean 
knowledge, (2) lack of systematic problem-solving, (3) high employee turnover, (4) disregard 
of procedures and standards, and (5) intercultural communication difficulties. The sixth 
barrier, (6) weak supplier performance, resulted from certain cognitive dispositions and 
behaviours of local suppliers. We will now outline the respondents’ accounts of these barriers, 
their interrelations, the relevance of the barriers to Lean production principles, and their root 
causes in the Chinese country context. An overview of these results is provided in Figure 1.  
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-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Lack of Lean knowledge.   According to our respondents, most shop-floor workers did not 
know about Lean production when they entered the company, and even university engineering 
graduates had only a very limited knowledge and understanding of Lean and its benefits (see 
quote 1 [q1], Table 1). This lack of Lean knowledge affected the implementation and 
internalisation of several Lean principles. Employees did not focus sufficiently on waste 
elimination, especially the elimination of less visible waste such as unnecessary transportation 
of goods (q2, Table 1). Due to their lack of Lean knowledge, the logistics department failed to 
achieve ‘production levelling’, as they paid insufficient attention to levelling out the demands 
actually needed in daily production and the supplier parts delivered to the temporary 
warehouse, thus creating waste in the form of temporary space. For similar reasons, 
‘preventive maintenance’ was not achieved. Supervising engineers did not understand that 
preventive replacements were necessary in order to avoid even slight deviations from the 
production schedule through machine breakdown, which could lead to major interruptions in 
the production flow. The one-piece-flow rule, in turn, was broken when shop-floor workers 
continued working and piling up produced parts, even though a downstream workstation was 
stopped because of a problem, thus creating buffers of unfinished products. Moreover, the 
absence of Lean knowledge on the shop floor made it hard to apply ‘continuous improvement’ 
from the bottom up. 
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INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE  
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Interviewees attributed the lack of Lean knowledge to several institutional-context 
factors. Institutional education was seen as the most important reason. According to the 
managers and Chinese engineers, Lean manufacturing was not part of even the most technical 
university courses.2 Operators, in turn, had usually obtained only a very basic level of 
institutional education (q3, Table 1), making it hard for them to use even simple tools such as 
fishbone diagrams, let alone grasp the complex links within the production system. Due to 
China’s recent industrialisation, Lean systems were also uncommon within Chinese industry 
in general, and employees therefore did not have a great chance of prior exposure to Lean. 
Notably, we found certain inter-regional differences. Due to the greater proximity of the 
Suzhou plant to the developed coastal region, it was easier to find Chinese recruits who had 
been educated in a more Western style, or had previously worked in a Western firm. Both in 
Changsha and Suzhou, however, the few Lean specialists were in high demand given the 
rapidly developing manufacturing industry, and were therefore particularly hard to recruit and 
retain. 
 
Lack of systematic problem-solving.   Systematic problem-solving is an essential requirement 
of Lean. Employees at all levels need to be able to detect problems occurring in the 
production process and find their root causes, in order to take countermeasures, improve the 
process, and ensure a problem does not recur. In the firm, management respondents reported 
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that most operators and many maintenance technicians were unable to analyse quality 
deviations systematically, and therefore unable to find root causes and achieve preventive 
maintenance or continuous improvement. According to managers in the production 
department, even Chinese engineers tended to analyse problems in a cursory manner and 
adjust only parameters, rather than eliminating root causes (q4, Table 1). Such superficial 
problem-solving had lowered the efficiency of the production system, for example through 
line stops, machine breakdowns, and the production of faulty parts (q5, Table 1). Due to this 
inattention to root causes, the same faults occurred repeatedly, leading to an unstable 
production process. 
The interviewees attributed this lack of systematic problem-solving firstly to insufficient 
Lean knowledge (see Figure 1, arrow linking lack of Lean knowledge with lack of systematic 
problem-solving), and secondly to several institutional and cultural factors in the Chinese 
context. Missing industrial experience was seen to be a prime reason, but Western 
respondents also explained that problem-solving skills were insufficiently developed in 
Chinese schools and vocational education, which they believed focus on memorising facts 
rather than practicing analytical skills (q6, Table 1). A number of interviewees also mentioned 
Chinese cultural values in this context. The strong regard of ‘face’ (mianzi) as part of Chinese 
culture was seen to inhibit employees from suggesting solutions, for fear that they might 
appear naïve. Moreover, an emphasis on harmony and relationships was taken as explanation 
for Chinese employees’ reluctance to reveal root causes of a problem. High power distance, in 
turn, was seen to prevent operators from escalating problems to higher levels and confronting 
a superior. Obviously, these cultural dispositions impeded Chinese employees in internalising 
the principles of continuous improvement. 
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High employee turnover.   High employee turnover strongly inhibited the participating firm in 
developing Lean knowledge and problem-solving skills, and technical expertise in general. 
Annual fluctuation rates amounted to up to 80 per cent, and skilled workers were extremely 
difficult to replace (q7, Table 1). Finding sophisticated labour was a challenge, and a great 
deal of training and time was needed before new recruits were able to start working within the 
Lean production system. In Lean terms, the additional training effort constituted ‘waste’. The 
main effect of high employee turnover was however through its impact on levels of 
employees’ Lean knowledge (see Figure 1, arrow linking employee turnover with lack of 
Lean knowledge). The turnover levels had also restricted the more mature Suzhou plant from 
gaining any significant knowledge advantage over the less mature Changsha plant. On the 
shop floor, the missing experience of newly recruited operators led to quality deviations and 
frequent interruptions of the production flow through wrong handling of parts and resultant 
damage (q8, Table 1). 
The interviewees attributed this high employee turnover to several root causes in the 
institutional context. Above all, China’s rapid economic growth had created multiple job 
opportunities. In the eyes of the interviewees, small salary differences were often a reason for 
changing employer. Due to China’s relatively recent industrialisation, there was also no well-
established occupational image of engineers. Many engineering graduates were seen to expect 
management tasks from the beginning rather than hands-on production duties, which led to 
disappointment after recruitment (q9, Table 1). Similarly, shop-floor workers were reportedly 
disappointed by the unexpected hard work and routine of the assembly line. 
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Disregard of procedures and standards.   Successful Lean production requires employees at 
all levels to adhere to well-defined procedures and standards, and operators need to follow 
their supervisors’ instructions on this matter. In the firm, however, respondents perceived that 
operators often did not follow management orders on procedures and standards, and that this 
seriously impeded successful Lean production. For example, rules of non-smoking and eating 
in dust-free areas were frequently broken. Workers were also seen to omit work steps and 
simplify their assembly tasks intentionally (q10, Table 1), knowing that the chance of getting 
caught by management was low. 
The complex assembly processes and specified takt-times of Lean left very little space 
for such deviations from work instructions, thereby leading to quality problems in the final 
product. For example, respondents explained that operators had often disregarded the one-
piece flow principle in order to gain extra break time (q11, Table 1). When a problem at a 
workstation occurred, they did not stop the assembly task at their own workplace to support 
problem-solving at the affected location. As a consequence, problem-solving took longer, and 
workers who continued their work had to store their semi-finished parts in the assembly line. 
This produced the risk of work steps being skipped and products being passed further 
downstream. 
When using visualisation tools, some workers tended to simply ‘tick off’ checklists 
without properly engaging in the tasks required, showing a clear lack of internationalisation of 
this practice. Management was thereby given a wrong picture of the state of production, 
creating the risk of breakdowns. The researcher’s own inspection of visualisation charts at the 
assembly lines, compared with observed problems occurring at the same lines, confirmed that 
the charts were overly positive. 
25  
The respondents relegated the perceived disregard of procedures and standards to the 
lack of Lean knowledge (see Figure 1, arrow linking lack of Lean knowledge with disregard 
for procedures and standards), and to China’s relatively recent industrialisation. Due to this, 
many Chinese employees, especially operators from an agricultural background, were 
unfamiliar with formal work procedures and standards. Several Chinese and German 
respondents also mentioned that in China, compared to the West or Japan, formal rules, such 
as laws and traffic rules, are generally treated as low-obligation. This in turn was ascribed to 
China’s relatively young legal system (q12, Table 1). 
 
Intercultural communication difficulties.   Effective interpersonal communication is essential 
for Lean production. Communication is important in training Lean knowledge, for supervisors 
to obtain their operators’ suggestions as part of continuous improvement, and for ensuring that 
changes made within the continuous improvement process are readily accepted and 
implemented by employees at all levels. All interviewees reported that it was hard to achieve 
effective cross-cultural communication between Chinese and Western employees on the sites. 
Insufficient English language skills were mentioned as the primary issue, particularly 
amongst operators, but also with regard to some Chinese and Western office employees (q13, 
Table 1). In addition, the disparity between the Chinese indirect communication style and the 
very direct German communication style lead to misunderstandings, for example when 
Chinese employees perceived Germans to be too direct and therefore rude, or to be 
inapprehensive of the points Chinese colleagues wanted to make (q14, Table 1). Some 
German employees had, in turn, been irritated when they felt that Chinese colleagues did not 
come to the point, or when they could not judge whether their instructions had been 
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understood. These difficulties in two-way communication made it hard to train and obtain 
Lean knowledge (see Figure 1, arrow linking intercultural communication difficulties with 
Lack of Lean knowledge). Communication difficulties, combined with high power distance, 
were also seen to hinder Western managers in obtaining any feedback and suggestions from 
Chinese employees, which disabled the continuous improvement process. Moreover, some of 
the German respondents perceived that the Chinese indirect communication style was long-
winded and therefore inhibited the rapid problem-solving required for one-piece flow 
production (q15, Table 1). 
The respondents traced the Chinese indirect communication style back to cultural 
roots, including Confucian values, high power distance, and a strong emphasis on ‘face’ and 
harmonious relationships (q16, Table 1). However, communication problems seemed to vary 
between different age groups, between the Chinese regions, and the length of collaboration. 
Younger employees and those from the more developed coastal regions were seen to possess 
better English language skills due to their greater exposure to the language. Chinese 
employees in the more mature Suzhou plant also reported that they had accepted the German 
direct communication style over time, and had even adapted to it so some extent. 
 
Weak supplier performance.   Nearly all participants at both plants reported on quality 
problems of mechanical parts sourced in China. Respondents explained that these quality 
problems emerged because the Chinese suppliers did not apply Lean principles and were 
unaware of the advantages of modern production systems (q17, Table 1). 
Several production leaders explained that continuous monitoring of incoming supplier 
parts was necessary to ensure stable processes. This additional internal quality check created 
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waste in the form of human effort, warehouse space and transportation. It also inhibited JIT, 
in particular the element of ‘ship to line’, where parts are delivered directly to the assembly 
line without additional checks, in order to minimize non-value-adding activities. High levels 
of supplier parts had to be stored in warehouses as safety buffers in order to balance the 
company’s cycle time with the supplier cycle time, and provide for interruptions on the 
supplier’s side. In Lean, such additional inventory is considered a form of waste. Moreover, 
by using traditional mass production, many local suppliers produced in big batches and 
delivered high quantities to the company’s warehouse, instead of JIT delivery of small batches 
at higher frequency. This contradicted the principle of ‘pull’ by the customer, and led to high 
levels of scrapped material when an error occurred, and to interruptions to the one-piece 
production flow. As a consequence, the firm set strict rules to prevent those parts to be further 
processed. If a problem was detected in a supplier batch, all other parts from that batch were 
refused or scrapped (q18, Table 1). Some interviewees therefore concluded that without 
reliable suppliers who followed Lean principles, the company’s own production system could 
not be truly Lean. 
Due to the poor reliability of local suppliers, the Chinese plants still depended on some 
key assembly parts or machinery spare parts from Western suppliers. These overseas 
deliveries, however, created additional costs and reduced flexibility, because over such 
distance, parts could not be delivered JIT. Additional warehouse space was required and 
orders needed to be placed in advance, making it impossible to achieve a continuous flow of 
parts. 
The suppliers were seen to make little effort to restructure their production according 
to Lean principles. This was explained partly by their limited exposure to and knowledge of 
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Lean, leading the owners of most supplier firms to persist in traditional production methods. 
This attitude was reportedly reinforced by the favourable order situation for Chinese suppliers 
in the current situation of economic growth. Respondents explained that it was easy for 
suppliers to find customers with lower requirements, and supplier firms were therefore not 
interested in setting up long-term relations with a company requiring high quality standards, 
additional investments in new production methods, and raising risks of failure when 
implementing these methods (q19, Table 1). 
 
Discussion 
Institutional and cultural factors of Lean manufacturing in China 
By interpreting our respondents’ accounts in the light of previous conceptualisations of the 
Chinese business system, we are able to delineate a set of interrelated institutional and cultural 
factors that created barriers to the transfer of Lean to China. With regard to institutional 
factors, four interrelated elements of the Chinese business system seem to be most relevant: 
China’s traditional norms of management, education and legal systems, and its manufacturing 
norms. 
As outlined by Redding and Witt (2007), China’s economy has through centuries 
developed on the basis of networks of family-owned businesses. In these firms, responsibility 
and decision-making lay primarily in the hands of the lao ban or big boss, whilst it was the 
employees’ role to follow the boss’s directions. This legacy is still apparent in the often-
observed reluctance of Chinese employees to take initiative and own responsibility (e.g. 
Zimmermann et al., 2003), which has also been strongly exacerbated through China’s periods 
of totalitarian control, where personal opinions and initiative could lead to severe punishment 
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(see Redding and Witt, 2007, 2009). Accordingly, participative management and delegation 
of responsibility are still not common in Chinese firms. This goes hand-in-hand with a lack of 
advanced skills in the Chinese workforce, with little emphasis on continuous training and 
long-term career perspectives within a firm (Witt and Redding, 2014:24). Importantly, 
China’s hierarchical management is also deeply rooted in the traditional Confucian value of 
obedience to superiors within the societal order. It is therefore not surprising that although the 
firm in our study tried to apply Western management methods in line with Lean principles, 
these fell on infertile ground as far as initiative, participation, and retention of Chinese 
employees were concerned. Interestingly, our respondents additionally perceived that Chinese 
engineers were unfamiliar with the role of a qualified engineer in Western firms to include 
hard hands-on work. This misconception may accord with the traditional hierarchical status 
division between manual and intellectual work (e.g. Barabasch et al., 2009)  
The importance of these management norms for Lean transfer becomes very clear 
when comparing it to the management models of Japan (Lean’s country of origin) and 
Germany. Both countries have a long tradition of participative management, combined with a 
highly skilled workforce strongly involved in decision-making and innovation of products and 
procedures. This workforce is commonly developed and motivated through long-term jobs, 
continuous training, and incentives such as reward-sharing (Redding and Witt, 2007: 57). 
There are notable differences between the German and Japanese management models. In 
particular, vocational skills training in Germany is more standardized and less firm-specific, 
and employees have greater opportunities to leave a firm (Streeck, 1996). Nevertheless, the 
similarities of the Japanese and German management models have been solid pillars of Lean 
production, facilitating the development of employees’ Lean understanding, initiative-taking 
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and systematic problem-solving skills, as well as long employee tenure. By contrast, the 
Chinese management norms are in these respects incompatible with the requirements of Lean 
production.  
Furthermore, China’s educational system is an important root of Lean barriers, as it 
shapes the technical and problem-solving skills of Chinese employees. Traditional education 
followed a method of ‘learning by rote and without questioning’ (Redding and Witt, 2009: 
391), rooted in Confucian values of obedience and reinforced through the eras of totalitarian 
control where questioning of official authority was prohibited and risky. Over the last two 
decades, engineering and managerial curricula in China have been reformed to stimulate more 
analytical and problem-solving skills. However, highly qualified engineers, managers, and 
well-trained workers are still in short supply for foreign firms (e.g. Li and Sheldon, 2011), and 
our findings suggest that knowledge of Lean production methods is particularly rare. This 
situation is aggravated by high employee-turnover levels and the lack of continuous skills 
training in firms (Redding and Witt, 2014: 21). Importantly, our findings suggest that in 
locations near the developed coastal regions, it is easier to find Chinese recruits with Western-
style education or experience in a Western firm. However, high employee-turnover rates set a 
limit to continuous in-house training, also near the coastal regions. 
Another important institutional factor can be seen in China’s legal system. China’s 
legal system has traditionally not been strong and has not created a system of 
‘institutionalized trust’ through rule of law (see Redding and Witt, 2014). Instead, Chinese 
businesses have tended to rely on personal relationships to establish trust with their circle of 
customers and business partners, based on norms of reciprocity (Redding and Witt, 2007). For 
these reasons, a disregard of formal legal rules is likely to be more acceptable in China 
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compared to Western societies and Japan, which have strong legal systems and 
institutionalized trust. Notably, China also scores low on Hofstede’s uncertainty-avoidance 
dimension, whilst both Germany and Japan score very high, implying that their members tend 
to appreciate and follow formal rules to a much higher extent than Chinese citizens (see 
Hofstede, 2003). Our study suggests that low obligation to rules affected Chinese workers’ 
adherence to Lean principles, as they did not feel morally obliged to adhere to the formal 
Lean principles. This effect was of course reinforced by workers’ lack of understanding of the 
function of Lean principles.  
Our study further suggests that traditional Chinese manufacturing norms, which are in 
stark contrast to Lean principles, still prevail in the minds of Chinese employees and supplier 
firms. Arguably, the Chinese mass production norms, which use large inventories as buffers 
between separate production steps, have in the past been developed and reinforced through 
China’s unpredictable political and legal systems. In times of political and legal uncertainty, 
mass production and the storage of large supplies may have been a safer option than JIT, low 
inventories and frequent delivery of small batches, which depend on high planning security. 
Moreover, traditional mass manufacturing relied on low-skilled workers following superiors’ 
orders, which accorded with traditional management norms. Additionally, opportunities to 
experience Lean manufacturing principles in China also remain scarce. For these reasons, it is 
not surprising that Chinese members of the firm and supplier firms were in our cases still 
strongly guided by traditional norms of manufacturing, and found it hard to internalize 
incompatible principles of Lean, such as JIT and elimination of inventories.  
Our findings highlight how certain cultural factors affected the transfer of Lean to 
China. Confucian values, high power distance, and the importance of maintaining face all 
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prevented operators from revealing and escalating problems in the production line and voicing 
suggestions for improvement. This made it impossible for the firm to achieve continuous 
improvement targets. The situation was further aggravated by the difficulties for German 
managers to understand Chinese employees’ indirect high-context communication style, and 
this made it hard for them to train Lean knowledge and gain feedback as part of the 
continuous improvement process. Language difficulties further fed into this issue, although 
they were weaker in the Suzhou plant near the coastal belt. 
 It is likely that China’s low individualism levels contributed to Chinese employees’ 
reluctance to analyse problems independently and express their ideas for improvements, given 
that these behaviours require responsibility and initiative at individual level. Even though 
there is evidence that individualistic values are growing in China, its individualism scores are 
still lower than in Western societies (see Allik and Realo, 2004).  At the same time, high 
collectivism in China is tied to the collectives of the family and social network (see Witt and 
Redding, 2014), rather than the employing firm as in Japan (see Streeck, 1996). Hence, high 
collectivism in China is not conducive to identification with a firm, firm loyalty, or long-term 
tenure. 
Notably, the outlined institutional and cultural factors created barriers to Lean transfer 
even within our Western company context. Lean was in our cases transferred from a Western 
headquarters to Western-firm subsidiaries, which were managed by a significant number of 
Western expatriates. The expatriates in these subsidiaries had been educated either in 
Germany or by German managers. They were therefore familiar with the requirements of the 
Lean system, and tried hard to deploy their Western leadership style and reproduce the 
Western Lean system in the subsidiaries. Nevertheless, Chinese employees’ cognitions and 
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behaviours seemed to be determined more strongly by the Chinese institutional and cultural 
environment. These factors are thus likely to have an even stronger influence and create 
greater barriers to Lean in an all-Chinese company setting, as observed in the firm’s Chinese 
supplier firms. Hence, our Western company setting makes it particularly clear just how 
strong the institutional and cultural determinants of Lean transfer still are.  
 
Lean or Lean with a ‘Chinese touch’? 
Given the lack of success in transferring Lean to the Chinese sites, and the host of barriers that 
were rooted deeply in the Chinese country context, some may wonder why the firm did not try 
to adapt the technical aspects of Lean to the Chinese context. Instead, the company’s explicit 
aim was to roll out their own Lean production system worldwide, in all its international 
subsidiaries, and not to allow for country-specific systems. The company had even 
established a dedicated Lean implementation department in all plants, to ensure that the 
production system would be used worldwide. 
This strategy of adhering to a uniform Lean system internationally, despite severe 
barriers, is not untypical of multinational companies within the automotive industry. It also 
offers certain benefits. For example, an adaptation of practices to the subsidiaries’ context 
also makes cross-border knowledge transfer more difficult, because it increases the 
‘stickiness’ of knowledge significantly (Jensen and Szulanski, 2004). The history of Lean 
may also explain why many manufacturing firms follow Lean production as their global 
production system. In 1990, Womack et al.’s publication of the results of the International 
Motor Vehicle Program demonstrated the superiority of Lean over traditional mass-
production systems. Since then, Lean has established itself as one of the most dominant 
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production paradigms of modern times (Voss, 2005). As a result of the high profile of the 
Toyota Lean system, most renowned globally-operating companies within the automotive 
industry have developed a company-specific production system, with the Toyota Production 
System as a raw model (Netland, 2013). Examples include Chrysler, Mercedes-Benz, Opel, 
Audi, Volkswagen, Ford, and Hyundai. These global companies have also adhered to a single 
Lean system worldwide and have not adjusted their production system to subsidiary 
contingencies (Netland, 2013). 
In view of this common practice in the automotive industry, it is not surprising that the 
host company took their standard Lean production system as a strategic practice and directed 
a great deal of effort to implementing it in China, without technical adaptation. However, the 
question remains whether it is, in the long run, better for multinational companies to adopt the 
HQ’s original production system worldwide, or to adapt their production system to other 
contexts. Researchers have tried to answer this question theoretically in terms of the ‘Lean 
adoption vs. Lean adaption debate’ within operations management (e.g. Sandberg, 2007; 
Jürgens, 2003; Cooney, 2002), without reaching a common conclusion. Regardless of the 
answer, it is crucial for manufacturing firms to understand the barriers to transferring Lean 
systems to another country context in order to deal with them, whether by training and 
developing their local workforce to adapt to the Lean system, or by adapting the technical 
system to the prerequisites of the local workforce. 
This study suggests that it is necessary to adjust and redesign at least certain elements 
of the Lean system. On the one hand, certain elements of the Chinese environment are likely 
to change in the near future. The English language skills and intercultural experience of 
educated Chinese employees are improving rapidly, which will lessen intercultural 
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communication barriers. Moreover, increasing exposure to Western production methods, 
including Lean, may raise the levels of lean understanding among employees and supplier 
firms. Also, the supplier firms’ market environment may not remain as favourable, making 
them more inclined to develop long-term relationships with Western firms that demand Lean 
procedures. On the other hand, changes in the systems of management, legislation, and 
education will take a long time, given their embeddedness in the long history of China’s 
institutions and culture (see Redding and Witt, 2007, 2009). Similarly, cultural values like 
power distance and face are unlikely to change dramatically in the near future, and will 
perpetuate behaviours that stand against Lean principles.  
The challenge will therefore be to adapt the Lean system to the Chinese context, 
without interfering with the technical aspects of Lean that are interdependent. To achieve one-
piece flow, for example, high levels of equipment reliability are prerequisite. Technical staff 
and Lean implementation teams need to achieve a challenging balance between retaining the 
global production standards set by headquarters, retaining the coherence of the Lean system, 
and adapting the production system to the context of the local country.  
For this purpose, it may be necessary to maintain tighter managerial control than 
envisaged in the lean philosophy. Lean-experienced managers rather than workers may have 
to take responsibility for guarding Lean principles in the production line, such as one-piece 
flow and total maintenance.  Obviously, however, this will not stop supplier firms’ non-
adherence to Lean. Our view is therefore that a compromise has to be found between Lean 
principles and local conditions within and around the firm. In this sense, manufacturing in 
China cannot at present be strictly ‘Lean’.  
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Taking a broader perspective, we can infer certain consequences for China’s 
technological development at a larger scale. It has previously been outlined that technical 
innovation, research, and development in China are constrained through China’s institutional 
context, for example the lack of institutionalized trust through a strong legal system, and the 
lack of funding through access to loans for entrepreneurs (Witt and Redding, 2014). Redding 
and Witt (2007: 227) therefore argue that China’s main competitive advantage is likely to 
remain for some time in its performance as the ‘assembly workshop of the world’ rather than 
in high-end innovative technology. At the same time, multinational enterprises are an 
important source of technological know-how for China, which they transfer both directly (for 
example through partnerships with Chinese firms or technological training centres), and 
indirectly through knowledge spill-overs (Giroud, 2014). Our findings add a new insight to 
these propositions. They suggest that even for the manufacturing sector, the Chinese context 
poses significant barriers as far as Lean production methods are concerned. Moreover, these 
barriers appear to exist even within Western firms in China (as opposed to Chinese firms), 
disabling them from transferring their Lean production methods to the Chinese context. This 
does not put China’s position as the assembly workshop of the world into question, but it 
demonstrates that we have to differentiate between different forms of production. Lean 
production, which may be the most efficient method for manufacturing high-end 
technological products, is likely to remain highly constrained for China in the near future, and 
this holds for both Western and local firms. 
 
Contributions to research 
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Based on our in-depth case study evidence, we were able to provide a systematic overview of 
barriers to the transfer of a Lean production system to China (RQ1), the effect of these 
barriers on particular Lean principles (RQ2), and their roots in the Chinese institutional and 
cultural context (RQ3).  
Some of the barriers that we have highlighted mirror those found in prior research. 
The reviewed studies on Lean manufacturing in China describe a lack of Lean knowledge, 
high employee turnover, and weak supplier performance in a similar way to our respondents. 
Moreover, the previously observed lack of initiative and participation are in our study 
elements of the barrier ‘lack of systematic problem-solving’, and the tolerance for untidiness 
is part of ‘disregard of procedures and standards’. Interestingly, prior studies on Lean in China 
identified three barriers likely to be specific to Chinese firms, and were therefore not present 
in our cases. Non-participative management, a missing long-term strategy, and inadequate 
quality-control procedures are likely to be less established and create greater barriers in 
Chinese firms that try to adopt Lean manufacturing methods, compared to the subsidiaries of 
a wholly-owned foreign company largely managed by Western expatriates. Furthermore, we 
revealed ‘intercultural communication’ as an additional barrier to Lean transfer, which is 
likely to be specific to the Western-Chinese setting in our Western subsidiary cases. Our study 
goes beyond prior research on Lean manufacturing in China by providing more detailed 
descriptions of the effects that the barriers have on the transfer of particular Lean principles 
and, most importantly, by explaining the barriers through Chinese context factors. 
Our study further contributes to transnational practice transfer theory (Kostova, 1999), 
by extending it to the particular practice of Lean production in the particular context of China.  
Whilst there is a large body of research on institutional and cultural factors affecting the 
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transnational transfer of other organisational practices to China, especially human resource 
management practices (e.g. Gamble, 2010; Yu and Meyer-Ohle, 2008; Schmidt et al., 2013), 
the same cannot be said for the transfer of Lean. In the same vein, there are several thorough 
investigations of the transfer of Lean manufacturing from Japan to Western countries, 
including the US (see Holweg, 2007) and Germany (Streeck, 1996), but we believe that our 
study is the first to systematically analyse the transfer of Lean to China.  
We also go beyond the institutional distance construct used in prior practice-transfer 
studies (e.g. Eden and Miller, 2004; Kostova, 1999; Peng et al., 2008), by defining a 
particular set of interrelated institutional and cultural factors that are relevant for this 
particular practice transfer. This approach is in line with Jackson and Deeg’s (2008) concern 
that institutional-distance measures do not take into account the specific features of particular 
countries’ institutions that affect transnational practice transfer. It has to be noted that the 
institutional and cultural distance between Germany and China is indeed large (e.g. Chao and 
Kumar, 2010), which also became apparent in our description of institutional and cultural 
context factors above. In line with practice-transfer theory (Kostova, 1999), this distance 
between the institutional and cultural context of the home unit (Germany) and the recipient 
unit (China) can explain why certain Chinese context factors created barriers to the transfer of 
Lean. However, we needed a more detailed description of relevant context factors, rather than 
an aggregate measure of institutional distance, in order to reveal the mechanisms by which 
these context factors affected Lean transfer. Moreover, we had to understand how the context 
factors were interrelated in order to estimate their future changes and speculate on the chances 
of Lean being successful in China in the near future. 
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We further contribute to the literature on national business systems. Firstly, we analyse 
how certain institutional and cultural elements of the Chinese business system are relevant in 
the case of transnational transfer of Lean practices. Secondly, we demonstrate how these 
institutional and cultural elements of the business system shape certain cognitive dispositions 
and behaviours of members of this business system, in our case Chinese employees and 
managers of the firm and supplier firms. This enabled us to point out that the elements of the 
business system affected organisational-level practice transfer via their influence on 
individuals. It was their cognitive dispositions and behaviours, shaped by their institutions and 
culture, which acted as barriers to the implementation and internalisation of the Lean system. 
Such a micro-level analysis has so far not played a significant part in business system models 
(see Witt and Redding, 2014).  
 
Limitations and suggestions for future research 
Our model of barriers to Lean transfer in the Chinese context is based on research in two 
plants of one firm, in two different locations in China. Using such a case-study methodology 
was appropriate for pursuing the under-explored research questions, for gaining an in-depth 
understanding of the mechanisms by which Lean barriers affect certain Lean elements, and for 
exploring how the barriers were tied to certain country-context factors. As with all case 
studies, however, further research is required to examine the transferability of findings to 
other settings (see Lincoln and Guba, 1999). Future research could investigate whether the 
model is also applicable in other regions in China, such as other inland, newly-developed 
industrial areas, or in other major cities. Furthermore, it is possible that at least parts of our 
model may be transferable to other emerging economies, such as Brazil, Mexico, and India, 
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which have parallels in their socio-economic context. Future research could also investigate 
the model’s transferability to firms headquartered in other highly industrialized nations, such 
as other European countries, the US, and Japan, which have developed different variants of 
Lean manufacturing. The need to explore Lean adaption reflects wider debates within the 
Lean community about how Lean adaption is managed within different contexts that are 
country-based and sector-based (e.g., Joosten et al., 2009; Jürgens, 2003).  Future research 
could compare and draw parallels between these types of adaption. 
From a methodological perspective, our interviews with Chinese respondents were to 
some degree constrained through language barriers, with regard to shop-floor workers as well 
as the office level. By adjusting the wording of the questions, and with the help of Chinese 
speakers, the interviewer was able to make good sense of their responses. However, it was 
difficult and at  times  impossible  to  gather  the  culturally-specific  meanings  of  the 
Chinese respondents’ replies. To overcome these issues, a Chinese interviewer would be 
necessary. Chinese language interviews are also a prerequisite for gaining access to shop-floor 
workers, whose cognitions and behaviour are particularly important in Lean production (e.g. 
Aoki, 2008), and whose perspective should therefore be ideally obtained first-hand. 
The majority of data was collected within a single research trip, which did not allow us 
to systematically explore changes in barriers or country-context factors over time. By 
comparing a more and a less mature plant, and by interviewing employees who had worked 
for the host company for several years, we were able to pinpoint certain ways in which 
country-context factors and barriers had changed over the previous couple of years. Moreover, 
signs of change became visible through our comparison between the two plants, one near the 
more developed coastal region, and the other in the less developed central part of China. Our 
41  
findings thus suggest that in the future, intercultural communication difficulties will decrease, 
and there will be a rise in the understanding of Western management norms and Lean 
methods. At the same time, this change will be restrained by China’s cultural and 
institutional roots. Future inquiries will need to deploy a longitudinal research design to 
examine the pattern of changes in barriers and underlying Chinese context factors over time, 
and to diagnose any other directions of change. 
 
 
Notes 
1. We use the term ‘employee’ to include all levels of the hierarchy. 
2. It should be noted that this perception is not in line with all current Chinese engineering 
curricula.  
 
References 
Allik, J. and Realo, A. (2004) Individualism-collectivism and social capital. Journal of Cross-
Cultural Psychology 35(1): 29-49. 
Aminpour, S. and Woetzel, J.R. (2006) Applying Lean manufacturing in China. McKinsey 
Quarterly 2(1): 106-115. 
Aoki, K. (2008) Transferring Japanese kaizen activities to overseas plants in China. 
International Journal of Operations and Production Management 28 (6): 518-539. 
Barabasch, A., Huang, S. and Lawson, R (2009) Planned policy transfer: The impact of the 
German model on Chinese vocational education. Compare 39(1): 5-20. 
Bicheno, J. and Holweg, M. (2009) The new Lean toolbox. Towards fast, flexible flow. 
Buckingham: Picsie. 
42  
Brown, G. and O’Rourke, D. (2007) Lean manufacturing comes to China. International 
Journal on Occupation and Environmental Health 13(3): 249-254. 
Cantwell, J., Dunning, J.H. and Lundan, S.M. (2010) An evolutionary approach to 
understanding international business activity: The co-evolution of MNEs and the 
institutional environment. Journal of International Business Studies 41: 567–586 
Chao, M. Ch.-H. and Kumar, V. (2010) The impact of institutional distance on the 
international diversity–performance relationship. Journal of World Business 45: 93–
103. 
Chen, L. and Bo, M. (2008) How to make 5S as a culture in Chinese enterprises. Innovation 
Management 3: 221-224. 
Chin, K.S. and Pun, K.F. (2002) A proposed framework for implementing TQM in Chinese 
organizations. International Journal of Quality and Reliability Management 19(3): 
272-294. 
Comm, C.L. and Mathaisel, D.F.X. (2005) An exploratory analysis in applying Lean 
manufacturing to a labor-intensive industry in China. Asia Pacific Journal of 
Marketing and Logistics 17(4): 63-80. 
Cooney, R. (2002) Is 'Lean' a universal production system? Batch production in the 
automotive industry.  International Journal of Operations and Production 
Management 22(10): 1130-1147. 
Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (1994) Handbook of Qualitative Research. London: 
Sage. 
43  
Eden, L. and Miller, S.R. (2004) Distance matters: Liability of foreignness, institutional 
distance and ownership strategy. Bush School of Government and Public Service, 
Texas A&M University Working Paper 404. 
Gamble, J. (2010) Transferring organizational practices and the dynamics of hybridization: 
Japanese retail multinationals in China. Journal of Management Studies 47(4): 705-
732. 
Gaur, A.S., Delios, A. and Singh, K. (2007) Institutional environments, staffing strategies, and 
subsidiary performance. Journal of Management 33(4): 611-636. 
Giroud, A. (2014) MNEs in Asian business systems. In M.A. Witt and G. Redding (eds.) The 
Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pp.441-464. 
Geertz, C. (1973) The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books. 
Hofstede, G. (2003) Culture's Consequences. Comparing Values, Behaviors, Institutions, 
and Organizations across Nations. London: Sage.  
Hofstede, G., Van Deusen, C., Mueller, C., Charles, T. and Business Goals Network (2002) 
What goals do business leaders pursue? A study in fifteen countries. Journal of 
International Business Studies 33(4): 785–803. 
Holweg, M. (2007) The genealogy of lean production. Journal of Operations Management 25: 
420-437. 
Jackson, G. and Deeg, R. (2008) Comparing capitalisms: Understanding institutional diversity 
and its implications for international business. Journal of International Business 
Studies 39(4): 540-561. 
44  
Jensen, R. and Szulanski, G. (2004) Stickiness and the adaptation of organizational practices 
in cross-border knowledge transfers. Journal of International Business Studies 35: 
508-523. 
Joosten, T., Bongers, I. and Janssen, R. (2009) Application of Lean thinking to healthcare: 
issues and observations. International Journal for Quality in Health Care 21(5): 341-
347. 
Jürgens, U. (2003) Characteristics of the European automotive system: is there a distinctive 
European approach? Discussion Paper, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production 
Systems and Work 2003(3). Berlin: Social Science Research Centre. 
Kostova, T. (1999) Transnational transfer of strategic organizational practices: A contextual 
perspective. Academy of Management Review 24(2): 308–324. 
Lee, C.Y. (2004) Perception and development of total quality management in small 
manufacturers: An exploratory study in China. Journal of Small Business Management 
42(1): 102-116. 
Li, Y. and Sheldon, P. (2011) Skill shortages: Where labour supply problems meet employee 
poaching. In P. Sheldon, S. Kim, Y. Li and M. Warner (eds.) China’s Changing 
Workplace: Dynamism, Diversity and Disparity. London: Routledge, pp.129-143. 
Liker, J. and Meier, D. (2007) 'Toyota Talent': Developing your people the Toyota way. New 
York: McGraw-Hill. 
Lincoln, Y. and Guba, E. (1999) Establishing trustworthiness. In A. Bryman and R. Burgess 
(eds.), Qualitative Research. London: Sage, pp.397-444, 
45  
Netland, T. (2013) Exploring the phenomenon of company-specific production systems: one-
best-way or own-best-way? International Journal of Production Research 51(4): 
1084-1097. 
Ohno, T. (1988) Toyota production system: Beyond large-scale production productivity. New 
York: Productivity Press. 
Oliver, N., Delbridge, R. and Lowe, J. (1998) Inside the Chinese automotive industry: The 
third lean enterprise report. London: Andersen Consulting. 
Paolini, A., Leu B. and Chinn, R. (2005). Exporting Lean to China: Know before you go. 
Available http://www.6sq.net/question/53753, accessed 4 December, 2014. 
Peng, M.W., Wang, S.Y.L. and Jiang, Y. (2008) An institution-based view of international 
business strategy: A focus on emerging economies. Journal of International Business 
Studies 39: 920-936. 
Redding, G. and Witt, M.A. (2007) The Future of Chinese Capitalism: Choices and Chances. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Redding, G. and Witt, M.A. (2009) China’s business system and its future trajectory. Asia 
Pacific Journal of Management 26:381-399. 
Sandberg, Å. (2007) Enriching Production. Perspectives on Volvo’s Uddevalla plant as an 
alternative to Lean production. Aldershot: Avebury. 
 Schmidt, C., Mansson, S. and Dolles, H. (2013) Managing talents for 
global leadership  
positions in MNCs: Responding to the challenges in China. Asian Business & 
Management 12: 477-496 
Schwandt, T. (2007) The Sage dictionary of qualitative inquiry. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
46  
Sage. 
Scott, W.R. (1995) Institutions and Organizations. London: Sage. 
Slack, N., Chambers, S. and Johnston, R. (2004) Operations Management. Harlow: Pearson 
Education. 
Streeck, W. (1996) Lean production in the German automobile industry: A test case for 
convergence theory. In S. Berger and R. Dore (eds.) National Diversity and Global 
Capitalism.  Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp.197-219. 
Taj, S. (2005) Applying Lean assessment tools in Chinese hi-tech industries. Management 
Decision 43(4): 628-643. 
Voss, C.A. (2005) Alternative paradigms for manufacturing strategy. International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management 25(12): 1211-1222. 
Witt, M.A. and Redding, G. (2014) China. Authoritarian capitalism. In M.A. Witt and G. 
Redding (eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp.11-32. 
Womack, J.P. and Jones, D.T. (2003) Lean thinking: Banish waste and create wealth in your 
corporation. New York: Free Press. 
Womack, J.P., Jones, D.T. and Roos, D. (1990) The Machine that changed the World. New 
York: Rawson Associates. 
Wong, M. (2007) The role of culture in implementing Lean production system. In 
J. Olhager and F. Persson (eds.) IFIP International Federation for Information 
Processing Vol.246. Boston: Springer, pp.413-422.. 
Yin, R.K. (2003) Applications of Case Study Research. London: Sage. 
Yu, J. and Meyer-Ohle, H. (2008) Working for Japanese corporations in China: A qualitative  
47  
Study. Asian Business and Management 7: 33–51. 
Zimmermann, A., Holman, D. and Sparrow, P.R. (2003) Unravelling adjustment mechanisms:  
Adjustment of German expatriates to intercultural interactions, work, and living 
conditions in the People’s Republic of China.  International Journal of Cross Cultural 
Management 3(1): 45-66.  
 
48  
Appendix - Participants 
 
Changsha plant 
Department Position German/Western Chinese 
Engineering Management 1 German 1 
Manufacturing Management 4 German / 1 Spanish  
Office level 2 German 8 
HR Management 1 German  
Purchasing Office level 4 German  
Logistics Office level 3 German 3 
Quality management Office level  2 
Cross-divisional Lean 
expert team 
Office level  1 
Suzhou plant 
Department Position German/Western Chinese 
Engineering Management  1 
Office level  5 
Manufacturing Management 1 German 1 
Office level  8 
HR Management 1 German 1 
Office level  3 
Purchasing Office level 1 French  
Cross-divisional Lean 
expert team 
Management  1 
Office level  6 
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 Figure 1. Overview of barriers, effects on lean principles, and context factors. 
 Table 1. Illustrative quotes 
 
Implementation 
barrier 
Illustrative quotes 
 
Barrier description Effect on Lean Country context factors 
 
Lack of Lean 
knowledge 
(1) “The major challenge to us is to 
make the people have real Lean 
thinking. … I have the feeling 
sometimes some young engineers 
think that Lean means an additional 
job on top of their daily tasks 
because they think ‘oh Lean asked 
me to do this and that’. They don’t 
realise the benefit. … So I’ve tried a 
lot to gain Lean thinking. … To make 
them understand and to establish 
the magic of Lean thinking is the 
most difficult portion of the whole 
job.” 
Chinese manager in Changsha 
 
(2) “… if you say ‘okay we have to  
eliminate, reduce the scrap’ … then 
everybody will realise ‘yes this is 
waste’. But invisible waste, for 
example transportation, storage and 
so on, it’s not fully understood in our 
organization, like the logistics. I told 
them a lot of times ‘why you are 
moving the parts from this location 
to that location? Why do you have to 
move it? I told them; ‘Why did you not 
move this directly to the usage 
position and so on?’ This is really not 
fully understood, what is the waste, 
invisible waste?” 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
(3) “When we talk with the operators,  
we find … they sometimes cannot  
understand  what  we  are trying  to  
explain  to  them.  ...  From   my   
understanding   one explanation for 
that is the very basic general 
education most operators had.” 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
Lack of 
systematic 
problem solving 
(4) “We have a huge problem here. 
… The process engineers tend to 
adjust parameters on the machinery 
without even knowing if that solves 
the problem in the long run. Without 
checking the root cause of the 
problem, they just try different 
things. They randomly change 
(5) “The lack of problem solving skills  
has effects on the production. For 
example, a machine was not running 
in the production line. Faulty product 
parts with wrong dimensions restricted 
some machine parts. The machine 
parts could not reach a sensor. The  
machine  indicates  a  problem  with  
(6) “I believe a big part of this is due  
to their education system. … In 
Germany, we start to learn this 
already in primary school. We need to 
solve our maths homework in three 
steps, question, equation, answer… 
Questioning problems, or 
independently looking into a problem, 
 machine settings and see if the 
workstation starts working again. 
They don’t know what they are 
doing. I continually try to explain how 
to solve problem systematically, but 
they always think the machine itself 
is the problem. That's a general 
problem among Chinese … They 
adjust machine parameters until 
somehow the machine works, then 
they say ‘great, now it works again’. 
But two hours or two days later, the 
problem is back and everything is 
worse.“ 
German engineer in Changsha 
 
the  process, and  what  do  the 
Chinese do? They mill the mechanical 
machine end stop away! Now the 
machine reaches the sensor again, 
but nobody realises that the supplier 
parts have the wrong dimensions. 
They did not consider that the incident 
occurred straight after new parts were 
delivered to the line.” 
German manager in Changsha 
I personally believe that doesn’t exist 
in Chinese education. The personal 
drive to get to the bottom of a problem 
and solve it, that’s what I miss among 
my subordinates.” 
German manager in Changsha 
Employee 
turnover 
(7) ” It is a big problem first to find  
good employees and then to keep 
them. Here in Suzhou’s industrial 
park, there is a high fluctuation. 
When considering changing 
personnel and to implement 
elements of Lean manufacturing, 
such as standardised work, 
importance of expert knowledge, 
and process repeatability, then we 
have a huge problem! This gives me 
big headaches at the moment. My 
division’s fluctuation is half of the 
Suzhou average, but that’s still far 
(8) “ … To do the work, you need to  
be experienced. If suddenly a new 
operator joins the line, the whole flow 
will be interrupted until the newcomer 
has the experience and knows what to 
do.“ 
German engineer in Changsha 
(9) “In Chinese Universities the 
students think when you are working 
at western companies, you go with 
your briefcase to work, you sit in your 
very bright office, just having a cup of 
coffee there. Every day you just speak 
English with your colleagues and do 
’trading‘ with other companies. But if 
they join the factory and realise that 
engineers need to work with their 
hands on machines, with grease, oil, 
and dealing with operators, they get 
very disappointed.” 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
 too high for implementing Lean.“ 
German manager in Suzhou 
(involved in the company’s graduate 
scheme) 
Disregard for 
procedures and 
standards 
(10) “For example, … if you ask 
them to make an operation 
according to standard work. At the 
first day they do it, but after two days 
they will make it out of their own 
experience. They will say ‘I will do it 
different, that is more convenient for 
me’. ” 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
(11) “We want to produce 
according to one-piece flow. For 
example there are three stations in 
total. The station one has some 
problems or they are interrupted by 
maintenance or other guys. However, 
the second operator and the third 
operator will still continue to work 
because they don’t want to lose their 
time in the traditional sense. Because 
they might think; ‘If I do finish my work 
there, I can get more break time’. But 
actually according to Lean concept, 
they shouldn´t do this. If station one 
stops, they should stop immediately 
and join problem solving. … We 
have trained them for a long time but 
they still don’t follow the rules.” 
Chinese engineer in Suzhou 
(12) “China has a long history, 
but China doesn’t have a long history 
of ’following the law‘. There were 
times when China didn’t have a very 
strict law system. Chinese people 
followed the leader. They were 
managed according to the leader and 
not according to the law. … That’s 
why Chinese people don’t obey the 
law so strictly. Chinese culture has a 
long history, but we don’t have this 
kind of law management.“ 
Chinese engineer in Suzhou 
Intercultural 
communication 
(13) “One major barrier is 
definitely the language barrier. In my 
job, I work closely with maintenance 
technicians within the shop floor, 
and among shop floor employees, 
there are very little English language 
skills. The younger guys might 
speak a bit of English, but I often still 
need to consult one of our 
(14) “Communication is the old 
problem. (…) The way of the German 
communication style is sometimes too 
strict that the other ideas have no 
chance to get accepted. My ideas are 
sometimes completely thought 
through, they are so strict. … But if 
I suggest my ideas to the Germans, 
in the first step when I am still 
(16) “The indirect style of 
communication can be explained by 
the Chinese traditional customs. … in 
China it is important that you keep a 
good relation, not argue so much. 
This is a Chinese tradition, but that is 
different than in Germany.” 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
 translators from the offices to help 
me out. To communicate with the 
shop floor, I need to use hands and 
feet … that takes a lot of time and a 
lot of effort.“ 
German engineer in Changsha 
speaking about the detail, but the 
conclusion is not speaking out yet, 
then they may stop the 
communication and my raw idea of 
the conclusion is still not being 
communicated out.“ 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
 
(15) “When we have a problem in 
the production, we need to solve it as 
soon as possible. If we can discuss 
the problems in a straight and direct 
manner, it’s easier to find a solution. If 
we avoid conflicts and not discussing 
problems to the point then we lose 
time until we are in big trouble!“ 
German manager in Changsha 
Weak supplier 
performance 
(17) “I  personally  went  to  a  lot 
of  Chinese  suppliers  to  see  if  
they  applied  Lean principles in their 
production; they showed me 
difficulties or gave some excuses. 
For example, the buffer areas in the 
suppliers’ production area...that’s a 
complete mess! They do not have 
‘FIFO” [First in first out] at all. The 
problem is that there is a high risk 
to mix different parts and materials.“ 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
(18) “The  Chinese  suppliers 
can’t  deliver their products  in  the  
quantity  and  in  the quality and in the 
frequency we require. Our company is 
in fact Lean; our internal processes 
are following Lean principles. 
However, the local suppliers are still 
producing in big batches. In order to 
fulfil our circle time, the supplier has to 
build up inventory within our storage 
areas. That is not Lean, because we 
do not reduce our inventory and 
consequently waste is generated.  
(19) “Why do our local suppliers 
not adopt Lean principles? Because 
they want to make quick money! If we 
give them a big order today and say 
’Okay, you can get our order but you 
must implement Lean principles’, most 
suppliers are not interested. … I think 
it’s particularly Chinese, because in 
the Chinese industry there are still 
suppliers who produce according to 
their current mass production 
principles and also are able to make 
money. So they think ‘why should I 
 Producing in big batches brings 
further problems. If we discover a 
problem with the supplier parts 
during our final assembly, the big 
batch of parts will be claimed as 
scrap...a lot of waste is generated. 
Moreover, because of the high 
quantities of lost parts, such an 
incident may also interrupt our internal 
production.“ 
Chinese manager in Changsha 
adapt to your way, you require me to 
do so much activities and I cannot get 
a bigger order. If I switch to another 
customer, I can also make money’. 
They still have a huge market so it’s 
not necessary for them to introduce 
Lean principles to make more money.“ 
Chinese engineer in Changsha 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
